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The manuscript Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Class XI n. 12, Zanetti
Latini 301 (= 1576), contains on fols. 1r–24v a seemingly unique copy of a series of fif-
teen logical questions, ten on obligationes and the remaining five on insolubilia.1 The
series on obligationes is untitled and unattributed in the manuscript, but the questions on
insolubilia begin (fol. 18r11) “Incipiunt quaestiones super insolubilibus,” and are attrib-
uted at the end to a certain John of Wesel (fol. 24v41): “Ergo expletae sunt quaestiones
insolubilium a Johanne de Vesalia Parixius2 disputatae. Deo gratias. Amen.”
Despite the first series’ lack of attribution, the two sets of questions seem to be-
long together. For in q. 3 on insolubilia, John discusses a view that amounts to saying
that a term occurring as part of a proposition cannot supposit for the whole proposition of
which it is a part. Such a denial of self-reference, he says, is to be rejected “secundum
quod prius fuit visum” (fol. 21v20). This appears to be a reference back to q. 2 on obli-
gationes, which discusses self-reference at length.3 It is probably safe to say, therefore,
that the two sets of questions form a pair, and that both are by John of Wesel.
II
Almost nothing is known definitely about the author of these questions. As
quoted above, the explicit to the questions on insolubilia indicates that they were dis-
puted at Paris. The Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis mentions two persons named
“Johannes de Wesalia” there, one — rather well attested — in 1344–1353,4 and another
1
 See Paul Vincent Spade, The Mediaeval Liar: A Catalogue of the Insolubilia-Literature, (“Sub-
sidia Mediaevalia,” vol. 5; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), items XLI–XLII, pp.
71–74.
2
 Parixius = Parisius. See Johann Georg Theodor Grasse and Friedrich Benedict, Orbis Latinus:
Lexikon lateinischer geographischer Namen des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Helmut and Sophie-
Charlotte Plechl, ed., 3 vols., (Braunschweig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1972), at vol. 3, p. 107.
3
 See Spade, The Mediaeval Liar, pp. 71, 74.
4
 See Heinrich Denifle et al., ed. Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. nova, 6
vols. (Paris: apud Heinricum Didier, 1937–1964), at vol. 1 (1937) , cols. 69.30; 72.9; 77.7, 23, 32, 44;
80.1 (Wessalya), 34, 48; 83.1, 18; 84.43; 85.13; 86.18, 25, 32; 87.24; 89.24; 90.25; 92.42, 44; 93.1, 4, 12,
28, 30, 31, 50; 94.2; 95.36, 42; 96.7, 25; 98.25–26; 101.5 (Wezalia), 12, 17, 20; 104.2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16,
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2in 1417.5 Lohr cites both of them (under the spelling ‘Vessalia’), and refers to (a) a
Quaestiones super artem veterem in Vatican, Vat. lat. 2148 (15th century), fols. 81r–128v,
and (b) a Quaestiones super libro Priorum in Vatican, Vat. lat. 3047 (15th century), fols.
1r–48v (spelled ‘Vesalia’).6 He does not claim to settle which of these two texts (if either)
is to be assigned to which author. Lohr also cites (c) a separate Quaestiones super artem
veterem (under the spelling ‘Vexalia’) in Vatican, Rossiana lat. 658 (15th century), fols.
1r–43v (spelled ‘Vexallia’),7 and remarks without comment that its author is apparently
“not to be identified” with that of (a) and (b). Presumably his reasoning is that a single
man would not have written two sets of quaestiones on the ars vetus. But such reasoning,
although plausible, is not decisive.
Kristeller, in addition to Venice, San Marco, Zan. lat. 301,8 and text (c) above,9
cites (d) a “Jo. de Vesalia, questions on Aristotle’s Analytica Priora and on Petrus Hispa-
nus” in Vatican, Vat. lat. 3047, but says nothing about its author. Presumably this is the
same text as (b) above.10 He also cites (e) Vatican, Regin. Lat. 1450, “Jo. de Wesalia
(professor at Pavia), de moribus pestilentibus,”11 and (f) Stresa, Collegio Rosminiano,
“De Marina, La legatura III, p. 19, n. 2557 E. mbr. XV. Illuminated. 47 fols. Joh. de Ve-
sallia, contra pestem, to Franc. Sfortia.”12 This is apparently the same text as (e) above.
There is no known reason to associate its author with Paris.
There is a striking textual similarity between the first question on obligationes in
the San Marco manuscript and an anonymous mid-fourteenth century author’s De arte
obligatoria preserved in a Merton College manuscript.13 In addition, both sets of ques-
20; 106.4, 48; 107.2, 20; 108.18, 26; 109.12; 112.12, 15, 19, 21, 44; 114.4, 41; 115.34, 37; 116.22, 32;
117.36; 118.21, 25, 44–45; 119.3, 24, 37; 121.31; 122.23; 123.20; 124.30, 33, 35, 38; 125.5; 128.18, 36;
129.26, 30, 31, 36–37 (Wezalia); 130.5, 13, 16, 47; 131.2, 7–8, 13, 38, 40, 42; 132.17; 140.37–38, 39, 41,
43, 45; 142.2, 5, 30 (Vesalia); 143.6 (Vesalia), 25 (Vesalia); 144.32 (Vesalia), 36 (Vesalia); 145.20
(Vesalia), 36; 146.9 (Wezalia), 20 (Wezalia), 27 (Wezalia); 148.14; 150.8; 152.31; 154.13 (Wezalia);
155.19, 25, 36; 156.1–2, 13, 17, 21, 32–33, 38; 157.7, 15–16, 26, 28, 31; 158.19–20, 35; 159.5 (Vesalia),
21 (Vesalia), 27 (Vesalia); 163.20 (Vaselya).
5
 Ibid., vol. 2 (1937), cols. 225.23, 226.23.
6
 Charles H. Lohr, “Mediaeval Latin Aristotle Commentaries. Authors: Johannes de Kanthi —
Myngodus,” Traditio 27 (1971), pp. 251–351 at pp. 299–300.
7
 Ibid., pp. 300–301. Note that Lohr gives no reason to associate this author with Paris.
8
 Paul Oskar Kristeller, Iter italicum: A Finding List of Uncatalogued or Incompletely Cata-
logued Humanistic Manuscripts of the Renaissance in Italian and Other Libraries, vol. 2: Italy. Orvieto
to Volterra. Vatican City, 6 vols., (London: The Warburg Institute, 1963–1993), at vol. 2 (1967), p. 212.
9
 Ibid., p. 466: “658 (X 39). misc. XIV–XV. Jo. de Vexalia, questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge and
on Aristotle’s Categories and de interpretatione, ¼”
10
 This work may or may not be the same as an “Exercitium Metaphysicae” by a John of Wesel,
preserved in a Basel manuscript, as cited by Friedrich Stegmüller in his review of Gerhard Richter’s
Studien zur Spätscholastik. III.. Neue Quellenstücke zur Theologie des Johann von Wesel, in Theologische
Revue 28 (1929), cols. 305–309, at col. 308.
11
 Kristeller, op. cit., p. 402. See also Stegmüller, op. cit., col. 308, and n. 15 below.
12
 Kristeller, op. cit., p. 573. Franz Sforza died in 1466; see Stegmüller, op. cit., cols. 308–309.
13
 Edited and studied in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, “The Anonymous De arte ob-
ligatoria in Merton College Ms 306,” in E. P. Bos, ed., Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics: Studies
Dedicated to L.M. de Rijk, Ph.D., Professor of Ancient and Mediaeval Philosophy at the University of
3tions show a close familiarity with the writings of Oxford logicians from the first half of
the fourteenth century, in particular with those of Roger Swyneshed.14 I am inclined
therefore to identify the author of the questions in the San Marco manuscript with the
John of Wesel who was at Paris in 1344–1353. But this attribution is conjectural, and is
far from certain.
It should be noted that our author is not to be identified with the much later Jo-
hannes (Rucherath) of (Ober-) Wesel (c. 1425–1481), who taught at Erfurt, Worms and
Basel, but not at Paris.15
III
Zanetti’s 1741 catalogue of the San Marco manuscripts describes the manuscript
laconically as follows16:
CODEX CCCI. Bess.17
in 8 chartaceus, foliorum 56.18
saeculi XV.
THOMAE De Anglia de insolubilibus.
Alia sequuntur ad Logicam spectantia sine nomine auctoris.
BURLAEI [Valteri] obligationes.
A fuller description may be found under the heading “Classis XI: Mathesis, As-
tronomia, Astrologia” in the Valentinelli catalogue19:
Leiden on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, (= “Artistarium,” supplementa, vol. 2; Nijmegen: Ingenium,
1985), pp. 239–280). On the similarity between parts of this text and John of Wesel’s first question on
obligationes, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Opposing and Responding: A New Look at Positio,” Medioevo:
Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 19 (1993), pp. 233–270 at pp. 241–244.
14
 See § V below. Indeed, the entire manuscript, as described in § III below, shows a strong con-
nection to Oxford logic of that period.
15
 See Anton Brück, article “Johannes Rucherath v. (Ober–) Wesel a. Rh.,” Lexikon für Theolo-
gie und Kirche, vol. v, col. 1097; and Stegmüller, op. cit., col. 309. Stegmüller suggests that this last John
of Wesel is the author of the treatise described above on the plague and addressed to Franz Sforza. See
ibid., cols. 308–309.
16
 Antonio Maria Zanetti, Latina et italica d. Marci bibliotheca codicum manu scriptorum per
titulos singulos digesta, ([Venice]: apud Simonem Occhi Bibliopolam, 1741), p. 132.
17
 The manuscript was donated to the Venice library by Cardinal Bessarion in 1468. For an ac-
count of Bessarion’s donation, see Henri Auguste Omont, “Inventaire des manuscrits grecs et latins don-
nés a Saint-Marc de Venise par le Cardinal Bessarion (1468),” Revue des bibliothèques 4 (1894), pp.
129–187.
18
 In fact, there are 58 folios, not 56, even disregarding a flyleaf at the end. See Valentinelli’s de-
scription, below.
19
 Bibliotheca manuscripta ad S. Marci Venetiarum digessit et commentarium addidit Joseph
Valentinelli, 6 vols. in 2, (Venice: Ex typographica commercii, 1868–1873), at vol. 4 (1871), pp. 223–
224.
4Cod. 12 membr., saec. XIV,20 a. 210, l. 142 [Z. L. CCCI]. B.21
I. Anonymi, quaestiones decem de obligationibus in dialectica.
«Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione dialec-
tica sint necessaria; arguitur quod non ¼», f. 1–18.
II. Quaestiones quinque super insolubilibus a Johanne de Vesalia
Pariziis disputatae. «Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit ¼», f.
18–25.22
III. Magistri Thomae Bradvardini de Anglia, insolubilia, capitibus
quatuordecim. «Solvere non est ignorantum vinculum, 3.o metaphysicae
ca. p.o Qui ergo insolubilium vinculo sunt ignari, nodum ipsorum am-
biguum nequeunt aperire ¼»,23 f. 27–37. V. p. 164.x24
IV. Brevia insolubilia et utilia, secundum usum Esoniensem. Ca-
pitula octo. «In disputatione dialectica sunt duae partes, scilicet opponens
et respondens ¼», f. 37–41.25
V. Tractatus obligationum Suiseyt de Anglia. «Cum in singulis
scientiis, secundum magnitudinem subiecti, sit certitudo quaerenda, primo
ethicorum ¼», f. 41–44.26
VI. Tractatulus de sensu composito et diviso, trifariam partitus.
«In principio uniuscuiusque operis, Domini nomen est praemittendum,
nam appetitum humanum solum divina bonitas replet ¼», f. 44–47.
VII. Burlaei, obligationes. «In disputatione dialectica duae sunt
partes, scilicet opponens et respondens ¼», f. 47–57.
20
 Note that Zanetti had described the manuscript as from the fifteenth century. If it is in fact
from the fourteenth, that would rule out our author’s being the fifteenth-century John of Wesel at Paris.
(See p. 2 above.) Unfortunately, the handwriting can probably not be dated that precisely. Nevertheless,
note the inscribed date October 13, 1398, at the end of Valentinelli’s description.
21
 The ‘B’ refers to Cardinal Bessarion. See n. 17 above.
22
 In fact the questions end on fol. 24v, not on fol. 25. Fol. 25r contains three short notes on in-
solubilia. See Spade, The Mediaeval Liar, item XVI, PP. 39–40. The remainder of fol. 25r and all of fols.
25v–26v are blank.
23
 Edited in Marie-Louise Roure, “La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et
au début du XIVe, suivie de l’édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine,”
Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 37 (1970), pp. 205–326.
24
 I presume this last refers to another copy of this work, cited in volume 5 of the Valentinelli
catalogue. But I have not seen that volume.
25
 Romuald Green, The Logical Treatise ‘De obligationibus’: An Introduction with Critical Texts
of William of Sherwood and Walter Burley (unpublished photocopy), Ch. 5, explains that this is in fact
two separate works, an anonymous and incomplete Obligationes (fols. 37ra–38vb) followed by the Brevia
insolubilia (so called in the explicit). The incipit of the former is like that of Burley’s Obligationes, but
the two texts are in fact not at all the same. The Brevia insolubilia  is in fact John Hunter’s (Huntman’s,
Venator’s) Insolubilia. See Spade, the Mediaeval Liar, item XXXIX, pp. 68–69.
26
 This copy was mentioned, but not used, in Paul Vincent Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Obliga-
tiones: Edition and Comments,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 44 (1977), pp.
243–285; reprinted in Paul Vincent Spade, Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages, (London:
Variorum Reprints, 1988).
5Idem principium ac numero IV. Ceterum differt ab initio eiusdem
operis in cod. [Z. L. CCCII], praesertim brevitate.27
VIII. Anonymi, de obligationibus. «Nunc restat tractare de obliga-
tionibus et praeponendae sunt aliquae descriptiones quorundam theoret-
matum spectantium ad artem ¼», f. 57–58.
Tractatus in fine mutilus.
In codice universo res adeo sine ordine tractatae sunt; verba ita per
nexus breviores intellectu difficilia, ut Bessario, qui manu propria singulos
operum auctores in propriis codicibus annotat, hunc inscripserit logicalia.
Plura sunt folia rescripta aevi eiusdem, ut et in fine folium referens frag-
mentum evangelii ex saeculo XII; quo serius inscriptum: MCCCLXXXXVIIII,
die XIII  mensis octubris.
As described in the last paragraph of Valentinelli’s description, several folios of
the manuscript, including several folios of John of Wesel’s questions, are palimpsests,
apparently all from the same twelfth-century copy of the Gospels. This fact makes the
manuscript especially hard to read in some places.
IV
Here are the incipits of John’s two series of questions:
Quaestiones super obligationibus
1. (fol. 1r1) Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in dis-
putatione dialectica sint necessaria.
2. (fol. 2r8) Consequenter quaeritur utrum pars possit supponere pro
toto.
3. (fol. 4v17) Consequenter quaeritur utrum sint tantum tres species obli-
gationis.
4. (fol. 6r22) Consequenter quaeritur utrum necessarium vel impossibile
sit ponendum vel deponendum.
5. (fol. 8r28) Consequenter quaeritur utrum propter concessionem par-
tium copulativae tota copulativa sit concedenda et propter
negationem partium disjunctivae tota disjunctiva sit ne-
ganda.
6. (fol. 11v1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum propter impositionem alicu-
jus propositionis ad illam sit responsio varianda, hoc est,
utrum propositio sit impertinens impositioni quae de novo
imponitur ad significandum.
27
 See n. 25 above.
67. (fol. 14r18) Consequenter quaeritur utrum omne positum in tempore
obligationis sit concedendum.
8. (fol. 15r12) Consequenter quaeritur utrum quaelibet talis ‘Nulla propo-
sitio est tibi posita’, ‘Nulla propositio est’, ‘Quaelibet
propositio est a te concedenda’ si ponatur et proponatur sub
eadem forma, quod sit concedenda.
9. (fol. 16r1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum tales copulativae sint ponen-
dae vel deponendae ‘Hoc est homo et hoc est asinus’, et
omne demonstratum est homo, ‘Uterque istorum sedet et
neuter istorum sedet’, et omne demonstratum per ly ‘isto-
rum’ sedet, ‘Hoc est homo et hoc non est homo’, et tantum
asinus demonstratur.
10. (fol. 17r1) Consequenter quaeritur utrum ista regula est vera: ‘Ista
consequentia est bona scita a te esse bona; et antecedens est
dubium; igitur consequens non est a te negandum’.
The questions on obligationes end with the explicit “Et aliae rationes sunt solutae
quia non probant intentum.”
Quaestiones super insolubilibus
1. (fol. 18r12) Quaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua conse-
quentia bona, et antecedens est verum et consequens fal-
sum.
2. (fol. 19r24) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliquod insolubile significat
praecise sicut verba praetendunt.
3. (fol. 20v32) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio causat in-
tentionem simplicem in anima repraesentem omnes propo-
sitiones, hoc est, utrum sit aliqua simplex intentio in anima
repraesentans omnem propositionem falsam ita quod isti
termino ‘falsum’ in voce vel in scripto correspondeat sim-
plex intentio in anima, et isti termino ‘verum’ in voce vel
in scripto correspondeat una simplex intentio in anima cu-
juslibet propositionis verae repraesentativa.
4. (fol. 22r39) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliquis casus in materia in-
solubilium sit admittendus.
5. (fol. 24r4) Consequenter quaeritur utrum aliqua propositio quae dici-
tur insolubilis sit vera.
7V
A complete statement of John of Wesel’s views on obligationes and insolubilia is
premature. Nevertheless, it is clear even now that John was familiar with the logical
writings of the Oxford “Calculators,” especially with Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes
and Insolubilia.28 In his second question on obligationes, for example, he asks whether
self-reference is possible.29 He concludes that it is, but in fact goes further: “Alia [scil.
conclusio] quod terminus in aliqua propositione potest supponere pro toto vel pro op-
posito sui totius vel etiam pro convertibili oppositi totius” (fol. 2v15–16).30 This unusually
explicit statement of the possibility of various kinds of “pathological” reference is almost
certainly an echo of Thomas Bradwardine’s third assumption in his Insolubilia: “Tertia
est ista: pars potest supponere pro suo toto et eius opposito et convertibilibus earun-
dem.”31
Again, in the third question on obligationes, John cites Walter Burley by name as
holding that there are six species of obligationes.32 In his reply, John cites Roger Swyne-
shed’s view (“auctor in littera”) that there are only three species: positio, depositio, and
impositio.33 Later authors often allowed only this more restricted list.34 John himself
holds, in agreement with Swyneshed, that three species will suffice,35 although he also
28
 Edited in Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes”; and in Paul Vincent Spade, “Roger
Swyneshed’s Insolubilia: Edition and Comments,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-
âge 46 (1979), pp. 177–220. The latter, like the former, is reprinted in Paul Vincent Spade, Lies, Lan-
guage and Logic in the Late Middle Ages, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1988).
29
 Some authors, known sometimes collectively as the “restringentes,” held that it was not. See
Paul Vincent Spade, “Five Early Theories in the Mediaeval Insolubilia-Literature,” Vivarium 25 (1987),
pp. 24–46, especially § VI, pp. 38–42.
30
 See § I above on a reference in John’s questions on insolubilia back to this question.
31
 Thomas Bradwardine, Insolubilia §6.04, Roure, ed., p. 297. For a discussion of the more com-
plicated kinds of “pathological” self-reference, see Spade, “Five Early Theories,” pp. 38–39. On Brad-
wardine’s theory of insolubilia, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Insolubilia and Bradwardine’s Theory of Signi-
fication,” Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 7 (1981), pp. 115–134; reprinted in Spade,
Lies, Language and Logic.
32
 See below, Quaestiones super obligationibus, § (30). For Burley’s view, see Walter Burley,
Obligationes, in Green, The Logical Treatise “De obligationibus,” § 0.02 (quoted in n. 108 below). See
also the translation in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, ed. & trans., The Cambridge Translations
of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Volume One: Logic and the Philosophy of Language (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988), p. 370. Burley’s list of six species was more or less the standard list in the
early obligationes-literature. See, for example, the Obligationes Parisienses (no later than the mid-
thirteenth century), in L. M. De Rijk, “Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation, II,”
Vivarium 13 (1975), pp. 22–54 at pp. 27–28. De Rijk places this work in the early-thirteenth century, but
a later date is possible as well. See Paul Vincent Spade and Eleonore Stump, “Walter Burley and the Ob-
ligationes Attributed to William of Sherwood,” History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1983), pp. 9–26, at p.
13 n. 20.
33
 See below, § (29).
34
 See Ashworth’s discussion in Paul of Venice, Logica magna, Part II, Fasc. 8: Tractatus de
obligationibus, E. J. Ashworth, ed. & trans., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 37 n. 11.
35
 See below, § (36).
8says that, because of the logic of the word ‘only’ (tantum), it is technically false that
there are “only” three species.36
Again, in the fourth question on obligationes, John asks whether a necessary
proposition or an impossible one can serve as the obligatum in a positio or a depositio.
Swyneshed had said no,37 although many other authors had allowed a special kind of
positio in which an impossible proposition is the positum (and so presumably also a kind
of depositio in which a necessary proposition is the depositum).38
The fifth question on obligationes asks whether a “copulative” proposition p & q
must granted if both conjuncts have been granted, and whether a disjunctive proposition
p  q must be denied if both disjuncts are denied. One of the most characteristic and
controversial features of Swyneshed’s theory is that he said “no” to both questions.39
Again, the sixth question on obligationes asks whether the correct response to a
proposition changes because of a new imposition. Another characteristic feature of
Swyneshed’s theory was that he said this never happens.40
The eighth question on obligationes also seems to be associated with Swyne-
shed,41 as does the ninth.42
Again, the first question on insolubilia reflects an especially characteristic and
controversial conclusion of Swyneshed’s theory.43 John in fact accepts the conclusion,
and in accepting it appeals to characteristic features and terminology of Swyneshed’s
view.44
36
 See below, § (35).
37
 Swyneshed, Obligationes, suppositiones 7–8, Spade ed., §§ (19)–(20), pp. 253–254.
38
 See for example, Burley, Obligationes, Green ed., §§ 3.01, 3.179–3.186; William of Ockham,
Summa logicae, Philotheus Boehner et al., ed., (“Opera philosophica,” vol. 1: St. Bonaventure, NY: The
Franciscan Institute, 1974), III–3.41.44–5 and III.3.42.1–83.
39
 Swyneshed, Obligationes, Spade ed., § (32), p. 257. For a discussion of the logic behind these
striking claims, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and
Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning,” History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (1982), pp. 1–32, espe-
cially § 7, pp. 28–31. For a discussion of the controversial nature of the claims, see Paul Vincent Spade,
“Obligations: Developments in the Fourteenth Century,” in Norman Kretzmann et al., ed., The Cam-
bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of
Scholasticism, 1100–1600, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Ch. 16B, pp. 335–341, at pp.
335–339.
40
 Swyneshed, Obligationes, Spade ed., § (21), p. 254. See the discussion in Spade, “Obliga-
tions,” pp. 339–340.
41
 See the discussion ibid., p. 340.
42
 See Swyneshed, Obligationes, Spade ed., §§ (105)–(114), pp. 276–279.
43
 See Swyneshed, Insolubilia, Spade ed., § 26), p. 189. See also Paul Vincent Spade, “Insolubi-
lia,” in Kretzmann, Cambridge History, Ch. 12, pp. 246–253 at pp. 250–251; and Paul Vincent Spade,
“Roger Swyneshed’s Theory of Insolubilia: A Study of Some of His Preliminary Semantic Notion,” in
Achim Eschbach and Jürgen Trabant, ed., History of Semiotics (“Foundations of Semiotics,” vol. 7; Am-
sterdam: John Benjamins, 1983), pp. 105–113.
44
 For these features and this terminology, see ibid.
9Finally, the second question on insolubilia discusses a characteristic claim of
William Heytesbury’s theory of insolubilia.45
The interesting thing about these links to Oxford logicians is that they appear in a
set of questions disputed at Paris. And if my conjecture about their author is correct,46
they appear as early as 1344–1353. No previous evidence has come to light for any
knowledge of Swyneshed’s views that early in Paris.47
VI
Throughout these two sets of questions, the San Marco manuscript presents a
careless, extremely dubious and often corrupt text. It is doubtful whether an adequate
edition of all fifteen questions is possible on the basis of this manuscript alone. Never-
theless, I have been able to reconstruct the text of three questions with fair confidence;
they are edited below. Some doubtful readings remain, but they do not affect the overall
sense. It is possible therefore to get a good idea of John’s doctrine on at least these three
issues.
One recurring abbreviation caused me particular trouble. It is ‘ det2 ’ — that is,
‘det’, with a “figure-2 r” following the ‘t’. It occurs in §§ (2), (19), (20), (21), (26), (27),
(28), (59) twice, and (61). In all cases, the subject is ‘antecedens’,48 and the context sug-
gests that ‘antecedens probatur’ or ‘antecedens patet’ would have been appropriate. With
some hesitation, I have read the abbreviation as ‘determinatur’. (The word ‘determinatur’
occurs nowhere else in these questions.) The reader should be warned about this word,
although the intended sense is clear enough in any case from the context.
Of the fifteen questions, I here present the text of the first and third on obligatio-
nes and the first on insolubilia. For the first question on obligationes, I have taken ad-
vantage of the anonymous Merton De arte obligatoria to conjecture two emendations to
the text. I have marked these emendations with the note ‘Ex textu Mertonensi’, and given
a reference first to Kretzmann and Stump, “The Anonymous De arte obligatoria,” and
then, in parentheses, to my paper “Opposing and Responding” where the particular
emendation is discussed.49
The division into paragraphs is my own. I have normalized the orthography. The
manuscript has been seen in microfilm copy only.
45
 For Heytesbury’s theory, see William Heytesbury, On “Insoluble” Sentences: Chapter One of
His Rules for Solving Sophisms, Paul Vincent Spade, trans., (“Mediaeval Sources in Translation,” vol. 21;
Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1979).
46
 See § I above.
47
 I am grateful to Professor Calvin Normore for calling my attention to this point.
48
 In the second occurrence in § (59), the subject is not expressed, but is still implicitly ‘antece-
dens’ from two sentences previously.
49
 For both papers, see n. 13 above.
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<Johannis de Vesalia Quaestiones super obligationibus>
I
(1) /1r Quaeritur primo utrum principia artis obligatoriae in disputatione dialec-
tica sint necessaria.
(2) Arguitur quod non. Principia obligationum non sunt necessaria; igitur, non5
sunt necessaria in disputatione dialectica. Consequentia patet, quia oppositum conse-
quentis infert oppositum antecedentis. Similiter arguitur a destructione consequentis ad
destructionem antecedentis. Antecedens determinatur, quia principium in obligationibus
est quod omne possibile debet admitti, et quod sit possibile.50 Sed constat quod haec non
est necessarium, cum51 sit in voluntate respondentis an velit concedere quod sit Romae10
dum sit Parixius.52 Etiam illa regula patitur instantias: ‘Posito possibili in esse non debet
sequi impossibile’ <vel ‘Posito possibili> in illam de inesse non sequitur impossibile’.53
Est falsum sicut patet de omnibus istis propositionibus in sensu diviso veris: ‘Album
contingit esse nigrum’, ‘Possible potest esse impossibile’,54 si ponenter in istas55 de inesse
‘Album est nigrum’ ‘Possibile est impossibile’.15
(3) Item idem: Si principia artis obligatoriae essent necessaria in disputatione
dialectica, sequeretur quod nullus56 sciret disputare in arte dialectica nisi sciret obligatio-
50
 That is, if p is possible, then not only must p itself be admitted (if it is posited), but ‘p is possi-
ble’ must also be admitted (if it is posited). The latter follows from the former, given the quite minimal
modal principle that (p)( p ® p). For, substituting p for p, we have: p ® p. By contraposi-
tion, this yields: p ® p. That is: p ® p. In short, if p is possible, so is ‘p is possible’.
Since every possible positum is to be admitted if it is posited, therefore if p is possible, then ‘p is possi-
ble’ is to be admitted. Q. E. D.
51
 cum] non (?) add. sed del.
52
 Parixius = Parisius. See n. 2 above.
53
 The text of the rule appears corrupt as it stands in the MS. The correct emendation is not cer-
tain, although the general idea is clear enough. See the text of the reply, in § (15) below. The phrase
‘posito possibili in illam de inesse’ means roughly “assuming the possibility is realized.” See the exam-
ples at the end of the paragraph. A propositio de inesse is an “assertoric” proposition, as contrasted with a
modal proposition. In my experience, the construction ‘pono in’ + accusative is unusual in the obligatio-
nes-literature. But John of Wesel uses it more than once. See again § (15) below. See also n. 55, below.
54
 Presumably John has in mind the traditional view that the possible can become impossible with
the passage of time. For example, before Adam’s sin, the proposition ‘It will always be the case that
Adam never sinned’ was false but possible (because of Adam’s free will). But after his sin, the same
proposition was no longer possible, and will never become possible again. Note that this explanation is
purely conjectural. We do not know enough about John’s theory of tense and modality (or about his doc-
trine of free will) to be confident that this is the sort of thing he was thinking of.
55
 istas] istis     For the emendation, see § (15), and earlier in § (2).
56
 nullus] terminatio incerta     But compare the reply in § (16) below.
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nes. Consequens est falsum, ut57 patet per experientiam. Et tamen consequentia patet per
quid nominis necessarii.58
(4) Etiam nullae species obligationis sunt necessariae in disputatione dialectica.20
Quod patet, quia nec positio nec impositio, quia unus potest disputare59 cum alio sine eo
quod ponat falsum possibile vel sine eo quod imponat terminos de novo ad significan-
dum. Similiter, sine eo quod petat quid falsum. Et sic de aliis speciebus.
(5) In oppositum est Aristoteles in 8o Topicorum,60 ubi tractat de arte obligatoria
tamquam de parte dialecticae.25
(6) Hic est notandum quod ‘obligatio’ sumitur in proposito pro aliqua oratione
qua quis obligatus per ista verba ‘peto’, ‘impono’, ‘pono’, et sic de aliis,61 tenetur af-
firmative vel negative vel dubie respondere.
(7) Similiter est notandum quod triplici causa62 casus sunt ponendi in obligatio-
nibus. Prima de causa, casus supponuntur ut temptetur 63 respondens numquid artem ha-30
beat. Secunda, ut disputatio habeatur, ut accidit inter conferentes ob causam exercitii.
Tertia causa est ut falsum possibile admittatur inquirendo quid sequitur et sciatur per
prius suppositum et rationem quid sumus acturi et responsuri.
(8) Item notandum quod haec ars nihil supponit dignum admitti nisi possibile. Et
quidquid sequitur de eodem admisso formaliter concedendum est infra tempus obligatio-35
nis sive disputationis. Et una cum hoc observetur quod quidquid repugnat posito vel con-
cesso vel eisdem64 est negandum, et quod65 ex illis sequitur est concedendum. Et ideo
haec ars informat respondentem quod advertat quid conceditur vel negatur ne duo repug-
nantia concedit infra idem tempus, quia Aristoteles in primo Elenchorum66 docet ar-
gumenta multa proponere67 ut de propositorum reponsione ob multiplicationem respon-40
dens non recolens redargueretur. A quo pro parte haec ars tradit originem ut advertentes
nos indeceptos servemus.
(9) Item notandum quod disputatio dicitur actus syllogisticus unius ad alterum ad
propositum ostendendum, et cetera, quod patet primo Elenchorum,68 quod quadruplex est
disputatio. Quaedam est /1v doctrinalis, et est illa quae syllogizat ex propriis principiis45
57
 ut] et     The emendation is conjectural and not strictly necessary, but makes for a smoother
reading.
58
 per … necessarii] That is, the nominal definition of ‘necessary’. John does not tell us what he
takes that nominal definition to be.
59
 disputare] abbrev. illeg. (forte  tamen) add. sed del.
60
 Aristotle, Topica VIII.4–8 159a15–160b13.
61
 aliis] lectio incerta
62
 causa] differentia     Ex textu Mertonensi, p. 243 [vi] (Spade, p. 242 n. 30).
63
 temptetur] teneretur     Ex textu Mertonensi, p. 243 [vi] (Spade, p. 242 n. 32).
64
 quidquid … vel eisdem] The ‘vel eisdem’ is awkward. Presumably the passage means roughly
“whatever follows from the positum or the concessum, or from the two together.” Also, one would have
expected the plural ‘concessis’ instead of the singular ‘concesso’.
65
 quod = quid
66




 Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 2 165a38–b11.
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cujuslibet disciplinae et non ex69 his quae videntur respondenti, quia sive respondens con-
cedit sive non nihil ad opponentem. Et addit causam hujusmodi, quod opponens in dis-
putatione doctrinali est loco docentis et70 respondens loco addiscentis. Nam71 oportet ad-
discentem credere.72
(10) Dialecticae disputationes dicuntur quae sunt ex probabilibus, et sunt collec-50
tivae contradictionum,73 hoc est natae ad concludendum utramque partem contradictionis,
quia dialectica debet habere rationes probabiles ad utramque partem contradictionis.
(11) Temptativae sunt ex his quae videntur respondenti.74 Et addit75 ‘necessa-
rium76 eum qui simulat se scire77 habere scientiam’.78 Quod potest exponi tam de illo qui
temptat quam de illo qui temptatur, quia ille qui temptat in communibus oportet quod55
sciat communia, et qui temptat in propriis oportet quod sciat propria. Similiter potest re-
torqueri ad illum qui temptatur. Oportet, cum scire ea simulat, se habere scientiam quia
nisi sciret vilipenderetur cum fuerit temptatus.
(12) Litigiosae disputationes sunt quae syllogizant ex his quae videntur prob-
abilia et non sunt.60
(13) Similiter per ‘principia’ in proposito intelleguntur propositiones seu regulae
quae sunt in ista arte.
(14) Tunc dicitur ad quaestionem. Prima conclusio est ista, quod in omni dispu-
tatione bona regulae obligationum sunt necesse. Ex qua sequitur quod fuit quod79 in dis-
putatione dialectica regulae obligationum sunt necessariae. Ista consequentia probatur: In65
omnia bona disputatione sic est quod sequens ex posito est concedendum, repugnans
posito est negandum, ad impertinens posito est respondendum secundum sui qualitatem
ita quod si sit verum est concedendum, si falsum est negandum. Et istae sunt regulae ob-
ligationum. Sequitur conclusio. Antecedens patet inducendo in disputatione juridica,
canonica vel simili, vel philosophica, et sic de omnibus aliis. Si respondens admittat80 ali-70
69
 non … ex] lectiones illegibiles     But see the text of Aristotle, Sophistici elenchi 2 165b1, the
Boethius translation, Bernard G. Dod, ed., (“Aristoteles Latinus” VI.1–3; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 7
lines 8–10: “doctrinales quidem quae ex propriis principiis cuiusque disciplinae et non ex his quae re-
spondenti videntur syllogizant ….”
70
 et] abbrev. incerta (forte  tamen) add. sed expunct.
71
 Nam] materia     The difference between the two abbreviations is a single minim, so that the
emendation is paleaographically minimal.
72
 See Aristotle Sophistici elenchi 2 165b2.
73
 contradictionum] contradictionem.     But compare the text of Aristotle, Boethius’ translation,
ed. cit., p. 7 lines 10–11: “dialecticae autem quae ex probabilibus collectivae contradictionum …”
74
 respondenti] terminatio incerta
75
 addit] quod add. sed del.
76
 necessarium] exemplum     But see the text of Aristotle, ed. cit., p. 7 line 13: “necessarium est
scire ei qui simulat habere scientiam ….”
77
 scire] terminatio incerta
78
 Ibid. See also the apparatus there.
79
 quod] supra lin.
80
 admittat] ponat     Positing is the job of the opponent in an obligational disputation, not of the
respondent. The text of the MS should probably be emended either to ‘respondens admittat’ (as I con-
jecture here) or else to ‘opponens ponat’.
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quam positam, quidquid sequitur ex illa est concedendum bene respondendo. Similiter
quidquid est repugnans illi est negandum bene respondendo. Sic similiter prius quaesi-
tum.81
(15) Ad rationes. Ad primam, “Principia obligationum” et cetera,82 negatur ante-
cedens et conceditur consequentia. Et cum dicitur “Illud est principium ‘Possibili75
posito’,” et cetera, conceditur. Et cum dicitur “Illud est falsum,” negatur, intellegendo
sicut Philosophus intellegit.83 Unde si sit aliqua propositio falsa possibilis et ponatur sic
esse sicut ipsa <significat>, nullum sequitur impossibile. Sicut ista est possibilis ‘Tu es
Romae’ te existente Paduae, et ideo si ponatur sic esse quod sis Romae, consequenter re-
spondendo non sequitur aliquod impossibile. Nec ipse intellegit quod propositio de pos-80
sibili <sic>84 ponatur in unam de inesse. Et cum dicitur “Illud non est principium, quia est
in potestate,” et cetera, conceditur. Tamen bene respondendo, cum sit possibile non im-
plicans contradictionem, quodlibet tale possibile falsum est admittendum.
(16) Ad aliam, “Sequeretur quod nullus sciret disputare,” et cetera,85 conceditur
‘nisi sciret regulas obligationum’.86 Unde aliqui sciunt obligationes et tamen ignorant se85
scire ipsas. Immo dubitant quid nominis obligationis. Unde, sicut dictum est,87 impossi-
bile est aliquem bene respondere nisi utatur /2r regulis obligationum. Tamen dubitat se uti
illis.
(17) Ad aliam, “Nullae species,” et cetera,88 conceditur. Tamen cum hoc stat
quod in qualibet disputatione dialectica necessariae sunt species obligationis, sicut etiam90
conceditur quod nullus homo necessario est, et tamen necessario aliquis homo est.89 Vel
potest dici quod aliquae species sunt necessariae, sicut positio et depositio, quia90 in
qualibet disputatione mundi positum vel positio vel depositum vel depositio habet fieri,
quia si aliqua conclusio tenetur <vel> sustinetur a respondenti, illa potest dici sibi91 posi-
81
 Sic … quaesitum] The sense appears to have been lost here. One would have expected some-
thing about how to reply to a propositio impertinens.
82
 See § (2), above.
83
 Aristotle, Analytica priora I.13 32a18–20; also Metaphysica IX.4 1047b10–12.
84
 Without the emendation, the sentence makes little sense in the context. With the emendation, I
interpret it as referring back to the examples given in § (2), where the propositions ‘Album contingit esse
nigrum’ and ‘Possibile potest esse impossibile’ were said to be posited “in istas de inesse ‘Album est nig-
rum’ ‘Possibile est impossibile’.” The present sentence, then, as I read it, says that Aristotle did not have
this kind of case in mind.
85
 See § (3), above.
86
 nisi … obligationum] The ‘nisi’ is awkward here. I have punctuated as if these four words are
meant to be an (approximate) quotation from the argument in § (3). In that case, the sense of the whole
passage is that the claim in that argument is granted. One would be unable to argue unless he knew the
rules of obligationes.
87
 Presumably, the reference is again to § (3), above, although the point is not put this way there.
88
 See § (4), above.
89
 This is presumably under the Aristotelian hypothesis of the necessity of species. John, who





 sibi] sive     For the emendation, see ‘sibi deposita’ in the next sentence.
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tum. Et ejus contradictoria est sibi deposita, quia durante tempore obligationis habet ne-95
gare illam, et cetera.
 III
(18) /4v17 <C>onsequenter quaeritur utrum sint tantum tres species obligationis.
(19) Arguitur quod non. Sex sunt species obligationis; igitur non tantum tres sunt
species obligationis. Consequentia patet. Antecedens determinatur, quia istae sunt species100
obligationis: institutio, petitio, impositio, positio, depositio, dubitatio, et sit verum.92
(20) Et confirmatur: Positio non est species obligationis; igitur, non sunt tres
species obligationis. Consequentia patet, quia si essent tres species obligationis, positio
esset de numero illarum. Antecedens determinatur: Si positio esset obligatio, ex non im-
possibili93 sequeretur impossibile. Sed hoc est falsum et contra omnes regulas obligatio-105
nis.
(21) Antecedens determinatur, quia si ponatur ista ‘Tu es Romae’, ista est ad-
mittenda, quia possibile. Deinde proponitur ‘Manus mea est clausa’. Et sit ita quod est
clausa. Est concedenda, quia est vera et impertinens. Deinde proponatur ‘Manus mea94 est
clausa vel tu es asinus’. Ista est concedenda95 quia sequens ex bene concesso, quia sequi-110
tur: “Manus mea est clausa; igitur, manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus” a parte dis-
junctivae ad totam disjunctivam. Deinde proponatur ‘Manus mea non est clausa’. Ista est
concedenda quia vera et impertinens. Et sit ita in tempore prolationis istius quod manus
mea non sit clausa.96 Tunc sic: Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; sed manus mea non
est clausa; igitur, tu es asinus. Ista consequentia est bona, et antecedens est a te concessa115
et vera; igitur, consequens est a te concedenda et vera. Et consequens est impossibile;
igitur.
(22) Sed aliquis diceret quod consequentia non valet, quia ad hoc /5r quod conse-
quentia sit bona a tota disjunctiva cum opposito unius partis ad aliam, oportet sumere op-
positum contradictorium unius partis et non subcontrarium. Unde ista consequentia non120
valet: “Homo est albus vel tu es asinus; et homo non est albus; igitur, tu es asinus,” quia
totum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Sed debet sic argui: “Homo est albus
vel tu es asinus; sed nullus homo est albus; igitur, tu es asinus.” Sic similiter in proposito:
“Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; sed nulla manus mea est clausa; igitur, tu es asi-
nus.”125
(23) Sed contra: Adhuc stat argumentum, quia posito sicut prius quod in tempore
locutionis disjunctivae habeas unam manum clausam et aliam apertam, et in tempore
prolationis illius ‘Nulla manus mea est clausa’ sit quod quaelibet manus tua sit aperta,
92




 mea] non add. sed forte del.
95
 concedenda] abbreviatio illegibilis add. supra lin.
96
 Earlier in the paragraph it was said that ‘Manus mea est clausa’ is also true and irrelevant. The
idea is that you have one hand open and one closed. For confirmation, see § (23).
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tunc per te consequentia fuit bona, et tamen antecedens fuit verum et consequens impos-
sibile.130
(24) Et confirmatur. Non sunt tantum tres species propositionis; igitur, non tan-
tum tres species obligationis. Consequentia probatur per definitionem obligationis:
“Obligatio est oratio qua quis obligatus97 <per ista verba ‘peto’, ‘impono’, ‘pono’, et sic
de aliis>98 tenetur affirmative vel99 negative100 respondere. Sed omne illud quo aliquis
tenetur affirmative vel negative respondere est propositio101; igitur, obligatio est proposi-135
tio.
(25) Similiter, obligatio est oratio; et non est oratio imperfecta; igitur, perfecta.
Et omnis talis est propositio. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis obligatio est propositio. Et sic
sequitur quod in omni102 propositione sit obligatio, quia omnis propositio vocalis est ora-
tio qua aliquis respondet affirmative vel negative; igitur, omnis propositio vocalis est ob-140
ligatio, quod videtur falsum.103
(26) Antecedens determinatur, quia multae sunt species propositionis: catego-
ricum, hypotheticum, affirmativum, negativum, modalis et de inesse, universalis et par-
ticularis. Et sic patet quod non tantum sunt tres species propositionis.
(27) Etiam nullius obligationis sunt tres species; igitur, obligationis non sunt tres145
species. Consequentia patet. Antecedens determinatur: cum quaelibet obligatio sit posi-
tio104 et complexum, non habet aliquas species, quia solum est una obligatio vel una spe-
cies obligationis; igitur, non sunt tres. Consequentia patet.
(28) Antecedens determinatur: Omnis obligatio est105 positio, cum in omni106 ob-
ligatione aliquid ponitur alicui ab ipso esse sustinendum.150
(29) In oppositum est auctor in littera,107 qui ponit quod omnis obligatio aut con-
cernit complexa tantum aut partim complexa et partim incomplexa. Si concernit com-
plexa tantum, hoc est dupliciter: vel hoc est ad concedendum, et sic est positio, vel obli-
gat ad negandum, sic est depositio. Si concernit partim complexa et partim incomplexa,
sic est impositio.155
(30) Sed alia est opinio magistri Gualteri Burley,108 qui ponit sex species obliga-
tionis. Et dicit quod obligatio sit praefixio alicujus enuntiabilis secundum aliquem sta-
97
 obligatus] obligatur     For the emendation, compare § (6).
98
 For the insertion, see ibid.
99
 vel] corr. ex abbrev. corrupta
100
 Note that the alternative ‘vel dubie’ of § (6) is here omitted.
101
 propositio] sed add. sed del.
102
 omni] sup. lin.
103
 Note that, contrary to the argument here, the definition of an obligatio was not that it is a
proposition whereby someone responds affirmatively or negatively (or doubtfully — see n. 100 above),
but that it is one whereby one is bound to respond so. See § (6).
104
 positio] propositio     For the emendation, see § (28).
105
 est] propositio add. sed del.
106
 omni] sup. lin.
107
 Swyneshed, Obligationes, Spade ed., § (3), p. 250.
108
 Burley, Obligationes, Green ed., § 0.02: “¼ Obligatio sic dividitur: aut obligat ad
actum aut ad habitum, et utraque sic dividitur: aut quia cadit super complexum aut su-
per incomplexum. Si obliget ad actum et cadat super incomplexum, sic est ‘petitio’. Si
16
tum. Et dicitur ‘obligatio’ quasi ‘ob aliud ligatio’. Unde ponit quod omnis obligatio109 aut
obligat ad actum vel ad habitum. Si ad actum, hoc est dupliciter: aut cadit supra com-
plexum vel supra incomplexum. Si supra incomplexum, est petitio, sicut cum petitur160
“Peto te concedere primum propositum a me” vel “Peto te negare” et sic de aliis. Ista ob-
ligatio cadit supra istum actum incomplexum: concedere, vel negare.
(31) Si supra complexum, sic est sit verum, sicut cum dicitur “Sit verum te scire
te currere” et sic de aliis. Ista obligatio cadit supra complexum mediante isto verbo
‘scire’ ‘dubitare’.165
(32) Sed ad habitum, hoc est dupliciter, quia aut indifferenter cadit supra vel in-
complexum, et sic est impositio vel institutio, vel tantum cadit supra complexum, et hoc
est tripliciter, quia aut cadit super complexum ad habendum pro vero, et sic est positio,
vel ad habendum pro falso, et sic est depositio /5v vel pro dubio, et sic est dubitatio. Et sic
patet quod sunt sex species obligationis.170
(33) Hic est notandum quod obligatio sumitur ad similitudinem obligationis
communiter dictae, quia sicut obligatio sit ex connexione aliqua110 ad implendum promis-
sum ex consensu utriusque partis, sic similiter sumitur in proposito. Et sic dictum est:
“Talis obligatio sit ob causam exercitii, vel ad habendum experientiam an aliquis habeat
artem, vel ut consequenter dicta sua sustineat ne repugnantia concedat.”111175
(34) Item, notandum quod ista de virtute sermonis est falsa: Obligationis sunt
tres species. Sed intellegitur quod illius termini ‘obligatio’ significative sumpti sunt ali-
quae species.
(35) Deinde ponantur aliquae conclusiones. Prima conclusio est quod non tantum
sunt tres species obligationis. Ista patet, quia sequitur: Tantum tres sunt species obliga-180
tionis; igitur, non tantum tres sunt species obligationis, quia si essent tantum tres species
obligationis, essent duae species obligationis112; et duae species obligationis non sunt tres
species obligationis. Et sequitur ab exclusiva ad universalem de terminis transpositis
“Tantum tres sunt species obligationis; igitur, omnes species obligationis sunt tres,” quod
est falsum, quia duae species non sunt tres, nec quattuor et113 sic de aliis.185
(36) Alia conclusio est quod tres species obligationis sufficiunt; igitur, tres obli-
gationes. Consequentia patet, quia obligatio non est nisi aliquis respondeat affirmative
vel negative vel dubie, cum non sit nisi oratio qua aliquis obligatus istis modis tenetur
respondere.
(37) Antecedens patet: Discurrendo per singulas propositiones et disputationes, si190
propositio proposita sit impertinens et scita esse vera, est concedenda; si sit impertinens
scita esse falsa, est neganda; si sit impertinens et dubites significatum per illam, est du-
super complexum, sic est ‘sit verum’. Si obliget ad habitum et cadat super incom-
plexum, sic est ‘institutio’. Si super complexum, aut obligat ad habendum pro vero, et
sic est ‘positio’, aut ad habendum pro falso, et sic est ‘depositio’, aut ad habendum pro
dubio, et sic est ‘dubitatio’ ¼”
109
 obligatio] ob  ligatio
110
 aliqua] tam add.
111
 Compare § (7).
112
 obligationis] igitur add. sed forte del.
113
 et] sicut add. sed del.
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bitanda; si sit pertinens et sequens sine obligatione ad hoc pertinentem, est concedenda; si
sit repugnans, est neganda. Sed constat quod omnis propositio est pertinens vel imper-
tinens. Et ex hoc patet quod aliae species obligationis, sicut est impositio, petitio, et sit195
verum, reducuntur ad illas.
(38) Similiter, in omni obligatione implicite habetur positio. Similiter, depositio,
quia omnis propositio quae ponitur, ejus contradictoria deponitur.
(39) Ad rationes. Ad primam: “Sex sunt species obligationis,” et cetera.114 Con-
ceditur consequentia, quia consequens est pro prima conclusione. Similiter conceditur200
quod istae sex species possunt reduci ad tres species.
(40) Ad aliam: “Positio non est obligatio,”115 negatur antecedens.116 Et conceditur
consequentia. Ad probationem “Si positio esset obligatio, ex non impossibili,”117 et cet-
era, negatur consequentia. Et cum dicitur “Ponatur quod tu es Romae. Deinde proponatur
‘Manus mea est clausa’,” conceditur, quia est vera et impertinens.205
(41) Similiter, conceditur quod manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus. Et cum
proponitur ‘Manus mea non est clausa’, ista est concedenda. Et tunc negatur consequen-
tia, sicut dictum fuit.118
(42) Sed si proponatur ista ‘Nulla manus mea est clausa’, ista est neganda, quia
quamvis non repugnat posito, tamen repugnat bene concesso.210
(43) Et etiam, responsiones sunt retorquendae ad idem instans.
(44) Unde est notandum: Si aliquis faceret talem consequentiam ‘Tu sedes; igi-
tur, tu non stas’ et in tempore prolationis antecedentis antecedens esset verum et in tem-
pore prolationis consequentis consequens esset falsum, ita quod dum consequens profer-
tur tu stares, tamen ista consequentia est a te semper concedenda, quia pro eodem instanti215
pro quo antecedens est verum, si consequens esset formatum, esset verum. Sic similiter
in proposito: Quamvis in tali copulativa ‘Manus mea est clausa vel tu119 /6r es asinus et
nulla manus mea est clausa’, quaelibet pars in tempore prolationis fuisset120 vera, tamen
quia copulativa copulat illas pro eodem instanti, ipsa est falsa et impertinens. Et ideo ista
consequentia est bona et concedenda ‘Manus mea est clausa vel tu es asinus; et nulla ma-220
nus mea est clausa; igitur, tu es asinus’, tamen tam121 antecedens quam consequens est
negandum.
(45) Ad aliam: “Non sunt tantum tres species propositionis; igitur,”122 et cetera.
Conceditur consequentia et similiter antecedens. Similiter conceditur consequens, quia
est pro prima conclusione. Etiam conceditur quod omnis obligatio sit propositio. Et sicut225
conceditur quod infinitae sunt species illius termini ‘propositio’, sic similiter illius ter-
114
 See § (19).
115
 See § (20).
116
 antecedens] aliquid add. sed del.
117
 impossibili] impertinente     Compare the apparatus to § (20).
118
 See § (22).
119






 See § (24).
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mini ‘obligatio’, quia tot sunt obligationes quot modis contingit obligari. Sed infinities
contingit obligari.
(46) Ad aliam: “Nullius obligationis sunt tantum tres species,”123 concedatur.
Unde dicitur quod sicut istae non contradicunt ‘Nullus homo est species’ ‘Homo est spe-230
cies’, supposito quod iste terminus ‘homo’ in secunda supponat materialiter vel sim-
pliciter et in prima significative et personaliter, sic similiter intellegitur in proposito quod
nullius obligationis sunt tres species, et tamen illius termini ‘obligatio’ significative
sumptus sunt tres species. Etiam si124 terminus supponat personaliter, tunc ista est falsa
‘Obligationis sunt tres species’, quia ut dictum est, species dicitur alicujus generis, scili-235
cet, alicujus termini incomplexi. Modo obligatio est propositio,125 quamvis iste terminus
‘obligatio’ sit quoddam genus potens supponere pro quolibet complexo quod dicitur ob-
ligatio.
(47) Ad aliam: “Solum est una obligatio,”126 potest dici concedendo. Sicut con-
ceditur ista127 ‘Tantum unum est’ quia omne ens est unum, sic similiter tantum una obli-240
gatio; igitur, omnis obligatio est una. Si tamen intellegitur quod tantum positio sit obli-
gatio, negatur, quia depositio et dubitatio et sic de aliis sunt obligationes. Et non sunt
positio, quamvis positio implicite in omni obligatione128 commutatur.129
/18r11 Incipiunt Quaestiones super insolubilibus
 I245
(48) <Q>uaeritur primo utrum in insolubilibus sit aliqua consequentia bona, et
antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.
(49) Arguitur quod non, quia ista est regula generalis, quod in omni consequentia
bona et formali antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.
(50) Similiter, in omni consequentia bona et formali, si consequens est falsum, et250
antecedens. Quod non esset si in aliquibus esset exceptio.
(51) Etiam Aristoteles esset diminutus et alii logici, cum numquam in aliqua
materia fecerunt exceptionem.
(52) Similiter, tunc in aliqua consequentia bona et formali oppositum conse-
quentis staret in veritate cum antecedente, quod est contra bonam consequentiam,130 cum255
in bona consequentia oppositum consequentis debet repugnare antecedenti. Probatio con-
123
 See § (27).
124
 si] uterque add.     It is possible to construe the ‘uterque’ as referring to ‘homo’ and ‘obliga-
tio’. But ‘homo’ is entirely irrelevant to the rest of the sentence.
125
 obligatio … propositio] in marg.
126
 See § (27).
127
 ista] iste     The masculine makes no sense here.
128
 obligatione] cor- (?) add. sed del.
129
 commutatur] lectio incerta (forte  comictatur)
130
 consequentiam] q- add. sed forte del.
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sequentiae,131 quia per te in bona consequentia antecedens est verum et consequens fal-
sum; ergo, oppositum consequentis est verum; et omne verum cum alio vero potest simul
stare in veritate, cum nullum verum alteri vero repugnat. Etiam, si consequens est falsum,
oppositum consequentis est verum. Patet per primum principium.260
(53) Similiter, per legem contradictoriorum, quod contradictoria non possunt si-
mul esse vera.
(54) Etiam, si esset aliqua talis consequentia, maxime esset ‘Istius consequen-
tiae132 talis consequens est falsum; igitur, consequens est falsum’, demonstrando per ly133
‘illius’ istammet consequentiam. Si ista consequentia sit bona, contra: igitur, non potest265
sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens;
igitur, qualitercumque significatur per antecedens significatur per consequens; sed ali-
qualiter significatur per consequens qualiter non significatur per antecedens, quia conse-
quens significat se esse verum et se esse falsum, et taliter esse est impossibile; et si ante-
cedens sit verum constat quod non significat sic sicut significatur per consequens; et si270
sic sit totaliter sicut significatur per antecedens, et non potest sic esse sicut significatur
per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens, igitur totaliter sic est sicut
significatur per consequens; et si totaliter sic est sicut significatur per consequens, conse-
quens erit verum; et sic, si antecedens erit verum, consequens erit verum.
(55) In oppositum arguitur: Ista consequentia est bona ‘Hoc est falsum; igitur,275
hoc est falsum’. Et demonstro per utrumque ‘hoc’ ipsum consequens. Et tamen in ista
consequentia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.
(56) Quod ista consequentia sit bona probatur: Oppositum consequentis repugnat
contradictorie antecedenti. Similiter, oppositum consequentis infert oppositum antece-
dentis; igitur, est bona. Similiter consequens est de intellectu antecedentis. Et istae sunt280
conditiones requisitae ad bonam consequentiam.
(57) Antecedens134 patet, quia da oppositum consequentis: /18v ‘Hoc135 non est fal-
sum’. Tunc, planum est, ista sunt contradictoria: ‘Hoc est falsum’ ‘Hoc non est falsum’
eodem demonstrato. Et sequitur: “Hoc non est falsum; igitur, hoc non est falsum,” eodem
demonstrato, quia sicut prius, oppositum consequentis et antecedens contradicunt.285
(58) Quod antecedens136 sit verum probatur, quia sit antecedens B et consequens
A. Tunc arguitur: B, si esset extra consequentiam et per se prolatum vel scriptum, esset
verum. Et non amittit137 suam significationem cum ingreditur consequentiam, nec est
variatio facta ex parte rei; igitur, tunc est verum. Consequentia patet, quia non posset plu-
ribus modis imaginari.138 Etiam, istae sufficiunt ad hoc quod propositio maneat vera.290
131
 consequentiae] terminatio incerta
132
 consequentiae] iter. sed secundum del.
133
 ly] abbrev. illeg. add. sed del.
134
 That is, the “antecedent” of the argument in § (56). The argument there is implicitly three
separate arguments: three conditions are met, each of which is sufficient for the validity of the inference.








 That is, one cannot imagine any more ways in which it might change its truth value.
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(59) Antecedens determinatur, quia B significat quod A est falsum, et subjectum
B solum supponit pro A et non falsificat se, et sic est totaliter quod A est falsum; igitur,
B est verum. Consequentia patet. Et determinatur ex alio, quia ponatur quod C sit una
consimilis propositio quam profert Plato, scilicet ‘Hoc est falsum’, ita quod subjectum C
etiam supponat pro A. Tunc C139 est verum, quia significat quod A est falsum, et non fal-295
sificat se, et totaliter sic est quod A est falsum; igitur, C est verum. Consequentia patet,
quia qualitercumque est verum, taliter vere contingit enuntiare; sed verum est quod A est
falsum; igitur, contingit vere enuntiare quod A est falsum.
(60) Tunc ultra: C est verum; et qualitercumque C significat B significat; et non
est pertinens ad inferendum se ipsum esse falsum; igitur, B est verum. Consequentia est300
nota, et antecedens similiter patet.
(61) Et confirmatur: Illa consequentia est bona in qua non potest esse sicut sig-
nificatur per antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens. Sic est in ista, ‘Hoc
est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’ eodem demonstrato. Consequentia patet. Antecedens
determinatur: Antecedens significat consequens esse falsum. Et rationabiliter sic est quod305
consequens est falsum, et non potest esse si hoc sit falsum, demonstrato A, quin ipsum-
met140 sit falsum.
(62) Hic est notandum141 quod est una opinio quae negat omnes tales consequen-
tias ‘Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit falsum’ si antecedens proferatur a Platone et
consequens a Sorte142 et si Sortes nihil dicat aliud quam talem propositionem ‘Sortes dicit310
falsum’, quia dicunt quod in nulla bona consequentia et formali antecedens potest esse
verum sine consequente. Sic est in proposito.
(63) Similiter, argueretur quod antecedens esset verum et similiter quod esset
falsum, quod est impossibile. Quod esset verum patet. Quod etiam esset falsum probatio:
quia sequitur “Ista consequentia esset bona et consequens esset falsum; igitur, et antece-315
dens.” Et patet per regulas Aristotelis.
(64) Item notandum quod si Sortes profert talem propositionem ‘Falsum est’ et
nullam aliam, quae sit A, et Plato profert talem consimilem ‘Falsum est’ quae sit B, quod
tales propositiones convertuntur, et nulla istarum esset vera. Etiam, si tales consimiles in
infinitum multiplicarentur ‘Falsum est’ ‘Falsum est’ et nullae aliae essent, quaelibet ista-320
rum esset falsa. Sed tamen si proferatur una talis falsa ‘Homo est asinus’ vel ‘Deus non
est’ sic significando, omnes tales efficientur143 verae.
(65) Sed ista positio videtur deficere. Solum est petere principium cum dicitur
“Ista consequentia est bona; igitur, antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.”
Nec etiam sequitur universaliter: “Antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente;325
igitur, consequentia est bona,” quia sicut dictum144 fuit alias,145 ista consequentia non valet
139 C] A
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 dictum] forte  dicta
145
 I have not located any such statement elsewhere in John of Wesel.
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‘Tu sedes; igitur, haec est vera “Tu sedes” vel talis propositio “Tu sedes” est vera’, quia
posset esse quod tu sedes et nulla talis propositio esset. Sed dicitur quod sufficit quod
non posset sic esse sicut significatur per antecedens quin146 sic sit sicut significatur per
consequens. Etiam aliis conditionibus requisitis, quod oppositum consequentis147 infert330
oppositum antecedentis, et cetera.148 Sic est in istis consequentiis: ‘Sortes dicit falsum;
igitur, dicit falsum’ ‘Hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc est falsum’. Et dicere quod in omni bona
consequentia si consequens est falsum antecedens est falsum est petere principium.
(66) Ideo dicitur ponendo unam conclusionem, quod tales consequentiae sunt
bonae. Et hoc probatur sicut prius.149335
(67) Ad rationes. Ad primam,150 /19r “Ista est regula generalis quod in omni con-
sequentia bona et formali,” et cetera,151 dicitur quod intellegitur in propositionibus sig-
nificantibus principaliter sicut est vel significantibus principaliter qualiter non est, et non
in talibus propositionibus se ipsis falsificantibus, quia in talibus casibus propositio falsa
convertitur cum vera et e converso. Et de illis Aristoteles non intellegit.340
(68) Et cum dicitur “igitur esset diminutus et alii logici, cum non fecit exceptio-
nem,”
152
 dicitur quod immo fecit exceptionem quarto Metaphysicae,153 ubi posuit contra
antiquos omnes tales propositiones se ipsas destruere ‘Omnia sunt vera’, quia si omnia
sunt vera, sequitur quod contrarium vel contradictorium illius sit vera, scilicet, ‘Non om-
nia sunt vera’.345
(69) Etiam posset dici quod non est inconveniens Aristotelem esse diminutum eo
quod non posuit omnia quae fuissent ponenda, quia <nec> ipse nec aliquis alius ad haec
sufficeret.
(70) Et sic similiter posset dici ad aliam,154 quod in tali casu non est inconveniens
consequens esse falsum et antecedens esse verum.350
(71) Ad aliam, “Illa consequentia non valet ubi oppositum consequentis stat in
veritate cum antecedente,” si ista est universalis, tunc est neganda, ita quod sit sensus:
“Nulla est consequentia bona ubi155 oppositum consequentis stat in veritate cum antece-
dente.” Si sit indefinita, potest concedi. Tamen cum hoc stat quod aliqua talis est bona,
sicut in proposito.355
(72) Alia est solutio,156 quia dicitur quod non potest sic esse sicut significatur per
antecedens quin sic sit sicut significatur per consequens. Et cum dicitur “totaliter sic est
sicut significatur per antecedens,” conceditur. Et cum dicitur “impossibile est esse sicut
significatur per consequens quia consequens significat se esse verum et se esse falsum et
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 quin] si add. sed del.
147
 consequentis] abbreviationes corruptae add. sed del.
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 For the required conditions, see § (56).
149
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 Ad rationes. Ad primam] iter. in marg. infimo paginae et etiam in initio fol.19r.
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taliter <esse> est impossibile,” potest dici: Concedo quod consequens est falsum et im-360
possibile, et hoc significat antecedens; igitur, concluditur quod antecedens sit verum. Et
similiter, conceditur quod totaliter sic est quod consequens est falsum, et consequens sig-
nificat quod consequens est falsum, et tamen consequens est falsum.
(73) Unde non bene valet ista consequentia: “Totaliter sic est quod consequens
est falsum; et sic significat consequens; igitur, consequens est verum.” Sed oportet addere365
‘et consequens sic significat et non est impertinens ad inferendum se ipsum esse falsum;
igitur, consequens est verum’. Et tunc antecedens est falsum, et per consequens similiter
consequens debet esse falsum.
